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RESPONSES TO THE FIVE QUESTIONS
Dr. Steven Metzt
1. TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11, WHAT IS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT LEGACY
LEFT BY THE TERRORIST ATrACKS? ARE WE SAFER?
The September 11 attacks sparked the most far-ranging
change in America's approach to security since the beginning of
the Cold War. Ideas that were once solid, even sacred, were
opened to scrutiny. Actions once unthinkable were accepted, even
embraced. In many ways, the United States of 2011 is very different
than the one of 2001. But despite extensive organizational and
strategic change, key issues are unresolved; the change begun on
September 11 is incomplete. As during the Cold War, U.S. security
strategy continues to unfold as the nation gropes its way forward.
The legacy of the attacks is stark to anyone taking an airline
flight or entering a government facility. Americans have grown
accustomed to countless indignities and annoyances in the name of
security. Today the physical presence of the U.S. military has
reached levels unseen since World War II. Airports are filled with
men and women in uniform, while a decade ago traveling members
of the armed services would have been in civilian clothes. While
the military remains extremely popular among the public, the
public is feeling the strain of a decade of persistent, large-scale
combat deployments. The economic repercussions of the attacks
continue to grow. While this is most evident in the increased
budgets for the military and intelligence community and in the
costs of funding the Department of Homeland Security, it also
shows up in the extra security and related inefficiency of securing
transportation, other infrastructure, and government facilities of all
types. A level of security which was once rare is now the norm.
The psychological legacy of September 11 is equally profound.
The traditional American concept of war-that it is episodic and
abnormal, and that it primarily involves conventional military
t Dr. Steven Metz is Chairman of the Regional Strategy Department and
Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute.
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forces (or at least guerrillas who behave much like conventional
military forces)-has given way to the notion that war is persistent
and unfolds within the civilian population. There are no
boundaries, whether physical or psychological, on the twenty-first
century battlefield. Yet there is resistance to this notion, a longing
to return to the old, more comfortable, and less confusing ideas.
People naturally gravitate to their comfort zones: within the U.S.
military and the wider strategic community, the argument exists
that the likelihood of U.S. involvement in irregular warfare and
counterinsurgency is fading. Strategic guidance released by the
Department of Defense in January 2012, for instance, indicated
that the U.S. military would continue to provide counterinsurgency
advice to partners but would no longer be structured for large
scale, prolonged stability operations as it had been for the previous
seven years.' As in the years following Vietnam, this argument
advocates a return to preparation for "real" war involving
conventional state militaries, walking away from the complexity of
counterinsurgency. Concerns with terrorism and stabilization
operations are, to a degree, giving way to renewed concerns about
other nations, particularly China. In November 2011, President
Obama indicated that the Asia-Pacific region was his
administration's highest priority and that he had instructed the
U.S. Department of Defense to sustain its role there.
At the same time, there are signs that the sense of national
psychological shock created by the September 11 attacks, which
allowed the United States to do things it previously would not have,
like the invasion of Iraq, certain types of domestic surveillance, and
the rendition of prisoners to states which tortured them, is fading.
This is seen in support for the closure of the Guantanamo
detention facility, for using the legal system to deal with some
terrorism suspects, and in public opposition to a military attack on
Iran. In the broadest sense, America's perspective on the nature of
security threats and on the appropriate response to them remains
1. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., SUSTAINING U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: PRIORITIES FOR
21sT CENTURY DEFENSE 6 (2012), available at http://www.defense.gov/news
/Defense-StrategicGuidance.pdf.
2. See President Barack Obama, Remarks to the Australian Parliament (Nov.,
17, 2011) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17
/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament. See generally AARON L. FRIEDBERG,
A CONTEST FOR SUPREMACY: CHINA, AMERICA, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY IN ASIA
(2011) (providing a comprehensive treatment of United States-China security
relations including the debates within the United States).
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different than it was on September 10, 2001, but is not the same as
it was immediately after the attacks.
The United States has not, however, fully grappled with three
major questions raised by September 11. One is the relationship of
religion and politics. Since the founding of the United States,
Americans have sought to separate the two. This made perfect
sense for a nation with a multitude of religions, denominations,
and sects. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the Bush
Administration sought to sustain this position, stating emphatically
that the threat was not Islam itself, but a distortion of Islam
concocted by extremists. But from the start, there were Americans,
particularly on the political right, who believed that al Qaeda and
other extremists reflected fundamental components of Islam. As
long as it was George W. Bush arguing that extremists were not
representative of Islam, this position remained on to the political
fringe, playing out more on the Internet and talk radio than within
the. political mainstream.
With the election of a Democratic president, however, the
gloves came off. Politicians and pundits on the right found that
public anger and hostility toward Islam was a useful tool to mobilize
their constituency and to attack a president whom a significant
portion of Americans continue to believe is a secret Muslim. 3 The
idea that Islam itself poses a threat and that there is some sort of
organized conspiracy to expand its influence within the United
States has moved from a fringe idea in the American public to one
4
that is embraced by reputable commentators. The building of new
mosques now inspires renunciation and demonstrations.
Islamaphobic organizations pressure corporations to pull
advertising from reality television programs that depict American
Muslims as normal members of society.5 It remains to be seen
3. Growing Number of Americans Say Obama Is a Muslim, PEW FORUM ON
RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.pewforum.org/Politics-
and-Elections/Growing-Number-of-Americans-Say-Obama-is-a-Muslim.aspx.
4. See, e.g., SHARAH: THE THREAT TO AMERICA, CENTER FOR SECURfY POLicy
(2010), available at http://shariahthethreat.org/wp-content/uploads/201 1/04
/Shariah-The-Threat-to-America-Team-B-Report-Web-09292010.pdf. This report is
the clearest example, as it was signed by individuals such as Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.,
former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (Acting);
Lieutenant General William G. Boykin, U.S. Army (Ret.), former Deputy
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence; Lieutenant General Harry Edward
Soyster, U.S. Army (Ret.), former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; and R.
James Woolsey, former Director of Central Intelligence.
5. See Shan Li, Lowe's Faces Backlash Over Pulling Ads From 'All-American
15212012]
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whether the mainstreaming of Islamophobia will gain greater
traction among the public and national leaders, but it clearly has
the potential to do so, with far-reaching implications for U.S.
national security strategy.
A second question raised but not addressed by September 11
concerns the United States' relationship with Israel. Al Qaeda and
other Islamic extremists have been very clear that American
support for Israel is a major reason they considered themselves at
war with the United States. But as the Bush Administration crafted
a post September 11 strategy, it discounted this idea, contending
instead that al Qaeda hated America for championing democracy
and individual freedom. This made perfect political sense. Clearly
Americans would not abandon their core values so the only
appropriate response was war with al Qaeda. If al Qaeda's
contention that the United States' support for Israel caused the
conflict, Americans might ask whether the strategic benefits of the
relationship justified the cost.
So far, the United States has been able to avoid dealing with
this conundrum. But if al Qaeda, one of its associates, or a group
or individual inspired by it, is able to undertake a major terrorist
attack on the United States, possibly one of greater destructiveness
than September 11, the Israel question may be on the table. Such a
debate might lead to the conclusion that America's relationship
with Israel is worthwhile no matter what the cost. But there is at
least a chance that Americans may reach a different conclusion.
A third question-and perhaps the most important of all-is
whether an eighteenth century Constitution is adequate for the
twenty-first century security environment. When the Constitution
was written, the United States was a minor state far removed from
the conflicts of great powers. It could afford inefficiency in its
national security strategy. Discounting frontier warfare with Native
Americans, the United States considered war to be a clearly
delineated conflict between the armed forces of nation states. To
avoid the endemic conflict which haunted Europe, the
Constitution divided war-making powers, making the president
commander-in-chief, but giving Congress the right to declare war
and the responsibilities to raise and support armies and to provide
and maintain a navy. And, while the individual rights specified in
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Constitutional amendments might be constricted during a time of
war (such as Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus), Americans
believed that once the war ended, so too would the constrictions.
As national security expert T.X. Hammes often says during
speeches and presentations, the Constitution was designed by
geniuses to create an ineffective government, largely to preserve
individual freedom against impingement by the state. That made it
difficult to create and implement an agile, coherent national
security strategy. Yet, this was acceptable so long as America's
enemies were other nations, which had to travel great distances
before posing a direct threat. It may not be acceptable when facing
terrorists, some of whom may hide among the American
population, shielding themselves with legal rights, and attempting
to acquire means of mass destruction. To counter al Qaeda and
similar organizations, the United States has taken steps, like the
USA PATRIOT Act, which are far from the intent of the Founding
Fathers. But, so far there has been no serious and sustained
national debate as to whether the Constitution itself needs to be
revised to reflect the new security environment.
While big questions remain unanswered, the United States did
undertake major changes in its approach to security after
September 11, 2001. The first phase of America's post-September
11 strategy included the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan (based
on the idea that state sponsors made transnational terrorists more
effective), a global offensive against al Qaeda's network, expansion
of the U.S. intelligence system, and the development of a massive
homeland security system. As a result, al Qaeda, as it existed in the
summer of 2001, has been shattered. According to Secretary of
Defense Leon Panetta, it is near defeat.6 But al Qaeda has
developed alliances, partnerships, and emulators elsewhere. Most
worrisome are those in Yemen and Somalia, as well as individuals
and small groups in Europe and North America.
The next stage in the evolution of the conflict with Islamic
extremism will be heavily shaped by the series of popular
revolutions known as the Arab Spring. For the United States this is
not a shock of September 11 magnitude, but it is forcing
Washington to re-think some aspects of the approach to national
6. Craig Whitlock, Panetta: U.S. 'Within Reach' of Defeating al-Qaeda, WASH.
POST (July 9, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/panetta-us-within-
reach-of-defeating-al-qaeda/2011/07/09/gQAvPpG5H-story.html ("The United
States is 'within reach' of defeating al-Qaeda.").
15232012]
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security first developed by the Bush Administration and largely
continued by the Obama Administration. In some ways the Arab
Spring validated the assumptions of the Bush strategy, particularly
that a shortage of political access and opportunity in the Arab
world fueled frustration, which could, under some circumstances,
be exploited by extremists. The good news is that the Arab Spring
and the American response to it further undercut the al Qaeda
narrative, which claimed that Washington was steadfastly opposed
to freedom in the Islamic world. While the revolutions in Egypt,
Tunisia, Libya, Syria, and the Gulf states have had a significant
human cost, they probably forestalled even greater bloodshed and
turmoil down the road.
At the same time, the Arab Spring removed regimes that had
served as American allies in the conflict with al Qaeda. While the
states that emerge, be they democracies or something else, are
unlikely to provide overt sponsorship to terrorist organizations,
they are also unlikely to serve as American proxies. None will view
extremism and terrorism as inextricably linked to the extent that
the United States does. If Arab nations move from
authoritarianism to rule of law and protection of civil rights, the
United States must remember that however unintentional, this
provides a form of sanctuary for terrorists. After all, much of the
planning and organization for the September 11 attacks took place
in Europe or the United States, not Afghanistan. Robust
democracy and growing economies may make it harder for
extremist organizations to recruit (but this remains to be seen-
terrorists found willing recruits in Europe during the 1970s despite
political freedom and economic opportunity). Yet, even if it does,
extremists will face less government pressure, at least so long as
they do not attack their host nation or violate its laws. In the
conflict with terrorists, then, the Arab Spring is both good and bad
news.
From a broader perspective, changes in public attitudes,
improvements in the intelligence community, attention to
homeland security, and offensive actions against al Qaeda have
made the United States less vulnerable to September 11-style
attacks. But this has come at a great cost. In his book Bin Laden's
Legacy, terrorism expert Daveed Gartenstein-Ross contends that al
Qaeda's goal all along was to compel the United States to spend
[Vol. 38:51524
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itself into weakness and defeat.' Ironically, this was precisely how
the United States won the Cold War-by forcing the Soviet Union
to spend so much keeping up that its economy collapsed. Al
Qaeda strategists knew that the costs of their attacks were miniscule
compared to the costs of defending against them.
A case can be made that at least part of the economic
difficulties the United States faces today are the result of the direct
spending to defend against terrorism, and the indirect costs arising
from the inefficiencies of increased security. The United States is
far from defeated but may be reaching a point where Americans
ask themselves if the burdens of more security, or even sustaining
the current level, justifies the costs. So while the United States is
safer from attacks, it is not clear that it is more secure in the
broadest strategic sense. As the American experience in Vietnam
demonstrated, it is possible to win every battle yet still lose a war.
The United States has always been most effective in conflicts
with a minimum of ambiguity. When the distinction between war
and peace, and between enemies, friends, and neutrals is clear,
Americans normally triumph. Al Qaeda and its allies recognize this
and have crafted an approach that maximizes ambiguity, thus
hoping to hobble the United States. One manifestation of this is
an ongoing debate over whether the terrorist threat should be
handled as a form of law enforcement. This has taken many forms,
including debate over the interrogation and detainment
techniques the Bush Administration used against terrorists.
One recent example is the Obama Administration's decision
to try Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame in federal court. Warsame is a
Somali national who was a member of al Shabaab, an extremist
group closely affiliated with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. He
was captured by U.S. military forces in the Gulf region and
detained for two months on a U.S. Navy ship until he was
transferred to the United States for prosecution. This was legal
under the traditional law of war. The Obama Administration based
its action on Public Law 107-40 (S.J. Res 23), Authorization for the
Use of Military Force, September 18, 2001. But while the decision
to try Warsame in federal court was a shift from the Bush
Administration position, it is not a full return to pre-September 11
7. See generally DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-Ross, BIN LADEN's LEGACY: WHY WE'RE
STILL LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2011) (contending that the United States'
failure to understand al Qaeda has led to strategic missteps that have unwittingly
helped al Qaeda achieve its goals).
15252012]
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ideas that treated terrorism as a law enforcement issue. Clearly, the
traditional distinction between war and peace, each with a different
set of rules and laws, no longer holds. But a new synthesis
appropriate for a conflict that is not, strictly speaking, either war or
peace is still unfolding.
So where are we? The United States is less vulnerable but far
from safe. The grim logic of terrorism suggests that defense against
terrorism must be nearly 100 percent effective, while terrorists
need only succeed occasionally. Al Qaeda as an organization is
weakened, but al Qaeda as an idea persists. Its emulators and
franchises will attempt attacks on the United States or on U.S.
targets and may, at some point, succeed. Al Qaeda has no chance
of inspiring the creation of a "caliphate" across the Islamic world,
but continues to impose great economic costs on the United States.
The America of the future may find these costs more onerous than
the economically stronger America of 2001.
Everything could change if al Qaeda or one of its partners
engineers another catastrophic attack on the United States,
perhaps using nuclear or biological means. If this does not
happen, America is likely to continue on its current path,
aggressively striking at terrorist organizations, tolerating the
expense of expanded security, and building a synthesis of laws and
rules. But if the nightmare scenario does occur, the result will be
the most far-reaching alteration of the American approach to
security since the nation's creation. Debate on issues such as the
applicability of traditional notions of legal and civil rights, the
viability of the Constitution, and the United States' relationship
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